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INTRODUCTION
Professor Steven Shavell's Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law1
offers a monumental overview of the application of economics to law. A work
of major significance, it is likely to occupy a prominent position in the pan-
theon of law and economics books, alongside works by icons of the movement
such as Ronald Coase,2 Guido Calabresi,3 and, of course, Richard Posner.4
This review analyzes the strengths and occasional limitations of Shavell's
book, and proceeds in three parts. Part I provides a brief survey of the contents
of the book, Part II highlights the book's significant strengths, and Part III
suggests a critique of the book. On the positive side, Shavell has written a
lucid text that is accessible yet does not shy away from masterful exposition of
complex topics such as externalities, informational asymmetries, and the diver-
gence between private and social welfare. My critique, however, focuses on
the notion that Shavell unnecessarily cabins welfare economics within a neo-
classical and utilitarian box. In placing too much faith in the ability of the tax
and transfer system to achieve distributional goals, and in eschewing deonto-
logical concerns, he too often ends up resorting to wealth maximization-ironi-
cally, the very method he chastises conventional law and economics scholars
for adopting.
I. SURVEY OF THE BOOK
While not as encyclopedic as Posner's Economic Analysis of Law,5
Shavell's work is nonetheless inspiring in scope. Presented in twenty-nine
* Associate Professor of Law, University of San Francisco. J.D., Harvard Law School,
M.B.A., Harvard Business School, S.B., Harvard College.
I STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2004).
2 See R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 20 (1988).
3 See GuIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
(1970).
4 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (6th ed. 2002).
5 Posner's treatise, now in its Sixth Edition, has the vast ambition of applying economic
analysis to virtually every area of the law, including family law, sexuality, and federalism.
See id.
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chapters across seven sections, the book is perhaps best conceptualized in two
major parts.
The first part provides an overarching perspective on the interaction
between legal and economic discourses. It comprises the beginning and end of
the book: the Introduction (Chapter 1), General Structure of the Law (Chapter
25), Welfare Economics (Chapters 26-28), and Concluding Observations
(Chapter 29). Shavell's perspective is neoclassical and utilitarian. In a nut-
shell, his views rest on the simple proposition "that actors are 'rational.' . . .
[T]hey are forward looking and behave so as to maximize their expected
utility."
6
The second part, consisting of the bulk of the book, tries to apply this
perspective to different doctrinal areas. As is typical of law and economics, the
most substantial discussion is of the private common law: property, torts, and
contracts. While his discussion of property focuses on real property and chat-
tels (Chapters 1-6), Shavell also devotes one chapter to intellectual property
(Chapter 7). Next, he tackles torts-where both individuals (Chapter 8) and
firms (Chapter 9) are tortfeasors-with a focus on deterrence (Chapter 10), as
well as liability and administrative costs (Chapters 11-12). After an introduc-
tory chapter (Chapter 13), discussion of contract law focuses on formation
(Chapter 14), and three special forms-contracts to produce goods (Chapter
15), as well as contracts to transfer possession and donative contracts (Chapter
16). Having completed its tour of private common law areas, the book shifts
gears, analyzing the litigation process through observations on civil procedure
(Chapters 17-19). The book ends with a discussion of public law enforcement
and criminal law, focusing on understanding the reasons behind punishment-
whether deterrence (Chapters 20-22), or rehabilitation and retribution (Chapter
23). Finally, Shavell seeks to apply economic analysis to criminal law (Chapter
24). Methodologically, "the emphasis is on theory, but some statistical studies
are noted."7
II. SIGNIFICANT STRENGTHS
Professor Shavell's book possesses a number of distinctive strengths that
make it an indispensable reference text for scholars and students of law and
economics. To begin with, it provides an excellent compendium of three
decades of his influential articles. Shavell's clear prose is to the point and
eminently readable-he is even careful to spare less mathematically-inclined
readers by relegating the technical exposition to footnotes. He has a gift for
being able to explain very complex ideas in refreshingly simple terms. Exam-
ples abound: the elegant use of the concept of "incentives" to frame a discus-
sion of property8 or "marginal deterrence" to structure a discussion of public
enforcement;9 the use of "repetitive value" to discuss how intellectual property
6 SHAVELL, supra note 1, at I.
7 Id. at 5.
8 See id. at 11-23. Shavell's approach builds on the work of Harold Demsetz. See, e.g.,
Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am. EcoN. REV. 347, 358 (1967).
9 See SHAVELL, supra note 1, at 518-19.
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("IP") differs conceptually from real property;'° or the masterful application of
the economics of agency relationships to discuss vicarious liability,' to name a
few.
In addition to its user-friendliness, Shavell's economic analysis of law
presents a number of striking advantages. While maintaining a necessary focus
on the insights that economics' ex ante perspective brings to law,' 2 Shavell's
book does not generally fall prey to the "law as science" dogma that haunts
Posner's work and much of law and economics." 3 Indeed, Shavell-who
laments how "many of the advocates of the 'economic' position appear them-
selves to be ignorant of the fundamental definitions and concepts of welfare
econornics"la-provides a sobering summary of the bulk of existing economic
analysis of law:
What, however, can be said of the notion of "wealth maximization," a social goal
advanced by many scholars who have analyzed legal rules in an economically ori-
ented manner? As I will now explain, (a) the goal of wealth maximization is not one
employed in welfare economics-indeed, it is not a well-defined goal, that is, it is
theoretically incoherent-even though the impression in legal academic circles is that
wealth maximization is the general normative goal endorsed by economists; (b) the
goal of wealth maximization has been criticized by legal academics for reasons that
are, ironically, largely consistent with welfare economics .... 15
As the book correctly and refreshingly argues, "[t]otal wealth is not a
function of the utilities of individuals, so is not, on its face, a social welfare
function. '"16 Defining "utility" brings with it its own set of challenges,' 7 but
one cannot underestimate the importance of a scholar of Shavell's stature urg-
ing law and economics to get beyond its fascination with wealth maximiza-
tion,' 8 which typically manifests itself as cost/benefit analysis.' 9 In addition,
'o See id. at 138-66.
'' See id. at 232-36. Curiously, Shavell does not deploy the principal/agent framework
when discussing the role of lawyers in litigation. See id. at 435-37.
12 See id. at 268 ("Rarely, however, does one encounter the belief that the main purpose of
accident law is deterrence and not compensation."); id. at 345 ("This suggests that the buyer
and the seller would agree, ex ante, to employ the expectation measure rather than any other
remedy for breach."). Cf. Bruce A. Ackerman, Foreword: Talking and Trading, 85 COLUM.
L. REV. 899, 900 (1985) (discussing the importance of ex ante economic analysis.)
13 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 4, at 3-4. For a critique of this dogma, see Reza Dibadj,
Beyond Facile Assumptions and Radical Assertions: A Case for "Critical Legal Econom-
ics", 2003 UTAH L. REV. 1155.
14 SHAVELL, supra note 1, at 669.
15 Id. at 667-68. Shavell goes on to observe that "legal academics who do not understand
the basic elements of welfare economics attach what they incorrectly perceive to be the
conventional normative economic framework, and employ arguments that are intrinsically
those of welfare economics." Id. at 669.
16 Id. at 668.
17 See infra notes 102-06 and accompanying text.
18 Wealth maximization is a variation on Kaldor-Hicks optimality which "says that a change
is desirable if gainers hypothetically can compensate losers." PER-OLOv JOHANSSON, AN
INTRODUCTION TO MODERN WELFARE ECONOMICS 5 (1991). Since no compensation need be
paid, Kaldor-Hicks ignores distributional considerations.
'9 See, e.g., Robin W. Boardway, The Welfare Foundations of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 84
ECON. J. 926, 926 (1974):
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his detailed analysis in three areas-informational asymmetries, externalities,
and the divergence between private and social welfare-simply shines.
The first distinctive strength of Shavell's work is a willingness to tackle
the informational asymmetries inherent in economic transactions. In marked
contrast to much of mainstream law and economics that seems enraptured by an
illusory world of perfect information,2 ° Shavell is willing to face reality. In his
discussion of conflicts among property owners, for example, he discusses the
"asymmetric information between parties that leads to miscalculations in bar-
gaining and failure to agree., 2 For its part, state intervention in property sales
may be justified "to cure a problem of lack of information on the part of a
participant in the sale."22 When discussing contracts, he is careful to note that
one "major reason for intervention in private contracting is lack of information
by contracting parties."2 3 Informational problems may also justify mandatory
disclosure,24 public intervention into remedies,2 5 and doctrines that allow one
party to escape performance, such as fraud or mistake.2 6  More broadly,
Shavell notes that "contracts are in fact incomplete, due to the cost of including
provisions and to the difficulty courts would have in verifying contingen-
cies."27 In torts, he acknowledges that "customers do not have enough infor-
mation to determine product risks at the level of individual firms." '2 8 And in
discussing litigation, he astutely observes that going to trial may not be the best
resolution, but merely one "considered to be due to asymmetry of informa-
tion."29 Shavell's focus on informational realities debunks simplistic ideas in
the public choice tradition that simplistically extol private contract.30
With few exceptions, cost-benefit analyses have proceeded by simply adding up total money
costs and benefits regardless of who receives them. . . . [Aiggregate money gains and losses
measure the efficiency gains of a project in the following sense. If the aggregate is positive, this
is taken to indicate that the gainers could compensate the losers and still be better off after the
project is undertaken.
As explored below, the great irony in Shavell's work is that it too often itself devolves to the
wealth maximization norm it so eloquently criticizes. See infra notes 124-31 and accompa-
nying text.
20 This tradition claims its intellectual roots in the first portion of a landmark article by
Ronald Coase. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
21 SHAVELL, supra note 1, at 90. Shavell also makes this point with regard to contract
renegotiations. See id. at 315 ("even if the parties are in contact with one another, asymmet-
ric information between them may lead to breakdowns in bargaining").
22 Id. at 56.
23 Id. at 437 n.29.
24 See id. at 331-35.
25 See id. at 353 ("buyer's value of performance may not be known to the seller at the time
of contracting, and this may influence the remedy for breach that courts will employ").
26 See id. at 334.
27 Id. at 343. See also id. at 299-301.
28 Id. at 214.
29 Id. at 408.
30 See, e.g., James M. Buchanan, A Contractarian Paradigm for Applying Economic The-
ory, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 225, 229 (1975); James M. Buchanan, Contractarian Political
Economy and Constitutional Interpretation, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 135 (1988).
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Second, Shavell devotes significant attention to externalities, 3' especially
in his discussion of property.32 It is worth remembering that mainstream law
and economics scholars tend to diminish the importance of externalities. Con-
ventional commentary relies on the so-called "Coase Theorem" which
famously postulates that:
It is always possible to modify by transactions on the market the initial legal delimi-
tation of rights. And, of course, if such market transactions are costless, such a rear-
rangement of rights will always take place if it would lead to an increase in the value
of production.
33
Shavell, however, aptly notes that "it may be socially desirable to limit
private contracting when contracts have external effects."3 4 The reason is sim-
ple: we do not live in a world of zero transaction costs, and it is thus quixotic
to believe that all parties affected will bargain around these externalities. After
all, "the explanation for why bargaining may not occur . . . when mutually
beneficial agreements exist is that the costs of bargaining-including the costs
of coming together and the time and effort devoted to the bargaining process
itself-outweigh the expected benefits. '35 Additional complexities, such as
judgment-proof defendants 36 and the distortionary effects of insurance,37 make
bargaining all the more difficult. As a consequence, "market resolutions of
externality problems [are] unlikely[" 38 making the Coase Theorem "not nec-
essarily a good guide for thinking."
39
Third, Shavell's careful attention to informational asymmetries and exter-
nalities contribute to what is perhaps the major achievement of Foundations of
Economic Analysis of Law: a sophisticated depiction of the differences
between private and social welfare.4" At several points throughout the book,
31 These include nuisances, pollution, risky behavior, or the use of common resources. For
a more detailed discussion of externalities, see Carl J. Dahlman, The Problem of Externality,
22 J.L. & EcON. 141 (1979).
32 Indeed, he devotes Chapters 5 and 6 to externalities.
33 Coase, supra note 20, at 15.
" SHAVELL, supra note 1, at 437.
35 Id. at 87. See also id. at 54; Dahlman, supra note 31, at 141 (Transaction costs include
"search and information costs, bargaining and decision costs, policing and enforcement
costs.").
36 Notably, judgment-proof defendants can externalize their costs on society. See SHAVELL,
supra note 1, at 230-32.
37 To his credit, Shavell devotes substantial attention to insurance issues. See, id. at 261-67,
437-43, 526-28.
38 Id. at 91.
31 Id. at 106. See also id. at 84 (simplistic variations of the Coase Theorem are "an immedi-
ate tautology"). Coase himself has convincingly argued that he presented the world of zero
transaction costs merely as a baseline against which economists should examine transaction
costs. See, e.g., COASE, supra note 2, at 174 ("The world of zero transaction costs has often
been described as a Coasian world. Nothing could befurtherfrom the truth. It is the world
of modem economic theory, one which I was hoping to persuade economists to leave.")
(emphasis added).
40 Early twentieth century welfare economists, notably Arthur Pigou, also understood this
difference. See, e.g., A.C. PIGou, ECONOMIC ESsAYS AND ADDRESSES 6 (1931) (Emphasiz-
ing the "distinction between private net product and social net product."). However, this
insight has been all but forgotten through decades of the Chicago School's laissez-faire law
and economics.
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Shavell acknowledges that government has an important role in enhancing
social welfare-a far cry from the laissez-faire predilections of mainstream law
and economics.4 Indeed, recognizing the differences between private and
social welfare has sweeping policy implications, which Shavell begins to
explore across a variety of doctrinal areas, including property, torts, and
procedure.
At the simplest level, he correctly appreciates the importance of public
goods.4 2 Put simply, "[w]hen individuals value services at less than their social
value, the privately sold quantity of the services will be undesirably low, and
thus there is an argument for their public provision, or for subsidy of their
purchase."4 3 As a consequence, public ownership of roads and rivers,' and
public provision of services such as "national defense, certain educational and
health-related services, and fire and police protection"45 can enhance social
welfare. Shavell drives home the point with a touch of humor, noting wryly
that "[w]ere a private company to own the Gettysburg battlefield, it might
decide to sell the land to a real estate developer."4 6 Similarly, he points to the
need for a public intellectual property regime.4 7 The book's appreciation of the
divergence between private and social welfare also allows the reader to ponder
a number of insightful questions in property theory-notably, the "relationship
between the social value of an innovation and the optimal length of [private]
property rights,"4 8 and whether "the argument that compensation for takings is
necessary to induce government to behave better is in some tension with our
attitude toward government behavior outside of the domain of takings."49
Though perhaps strongest when discussing property, the book is also
thought-provoking in other doctrinal areas. It aptly argues that the "socially
ideal and the privately desired degree of search effort" 5 ° for contractual oppor-
tunities diverges and that a "basic rationale for legislative or judicial overriding
of contracts is the existence of harmful externalities."'" Moreover, Shavell
shows that private parties have incentives to break contracts if not for their
public enforcement.52
1 This is precisely why many scholars who argue for cabining government find information
asymmetries and externalities so infuriating. See, e.g., Daniel D. Polsby, Should Govern-
ment Attempt to Influence Consumer Preference?, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 197, 200
(1999) ("Externality regulation is not a limiting principle but an illimitable one.").
42 See infra notes 43-49 and accompanying text. Public goods can be conceptualized as
those which present positive externalities.
43 See SHAVELL, supra note 1, at 121.
4 See id. at 116-17.
41 Id. at 120. As Shavell summarizes, the "main justifications for public property are either
that the private sector cannot profit sufficiently to be led to supply certain property when it
would be socially desirable, or that a private supplier of property would charge too high a
price for, and thus undesirably discourage, its use." Id. at 111.
46 Id. at 119.
" See id. at 161. For a discussion of the dangers of current efforts to privatize intellectual
property, see Reza Dibadj, Regulatory Givings and the Anticommons, 64 O14o ST. L.J. 1041
(2003).
48 See SHAVELL, supra note 1, at 146.
49 Id. at 130.
50 Id. at 325.
5' Id. at 320.
52 Id. at 297-98.
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In the realm of torts, Shavell correctly reminds readers that "the private
incentives to use the [accident law] system are generally different from the
socially desirable incentives to do so. ' '53 Shavell is even willing to buck the
conventional wisdom in law and economics that believes strict liability some-
how to be inefficient: He argues that under a strict liability regime, "the level
of production will be optimal, because the price will equal the social costs of
production per unit."5 4 Strict products liability, for instance, helps protect con-
sumers who simply do not have the knowledge to identify a wide range of risks
inherent in the products and services they consider purchasing.55
Similarly, there exists potential divergence between private and social
welfare at every step of the litigation process: Bringing suit may not be
socially desirable, 56 private parties externalize a portion of their costs of litiga-
tion on society, 57 and might have "excessive or insufficient" 58 incentives to
conduct discovery or even provide inaccurate information. 59 For its part,
"asymmetric information leads parties to fail to settle because they may mis-
gauge each others' situations. ' ' 60 Readers are also left to ponder whether the
"social incentive to have a trial may sometimes exceed the private incen-
tive" 1-after all, trials can deter socially undesirable behavior by revealing
information publicly, 62  establishing precedent, 63  and reinforcing social
norms.' More generally, Shavell is willing to challenge those who present
private legal systems as a panacea to what ails public law.65
51 Id. at 176.
" Id. at 211. See also id. at 218.
55 See id. at 215:
Customers' knowledge of the risks attending use of a wide class of modern-day products (auto-
mobiles, drugs, machines) is, one assumes, limited in significant ways because of customers'
quite natural inability to understand how the products function. And customers' knowledge of
the quality of most professional services (medical, legal, architectural) is, one supposes, similarly
limited.
Unfortunately, Shavell later manages to undercut his own argument by suggesting that per-
haps "consumer information is often tolerably good and that, on net, the marginal deterrence
engendered by the threat of product liability is not great." Id. at 396. Shavell's embrace of
neoclassicism most likely explains this ambivalence. See infra note 72 and accompanying
text.
56 See SHAVEL, supra note 1, at 391.
57 See id. at 411 ("[P]arties involved in litigation do not bear the salaries of judges and of
ancillary personnel, the value of jurors' time, the implicit rent on court buildings, and the
like .... ").
58 Id. at 428.
59 See id. at 454 ("A plaintiff may want to conceal facts in order to prevail against a defen-
dant who is in fact innocent or may want to exaggerate his losses; a defendant may have
similarly perverse incentives to prevent the truth from becoming known.").
60 Id. at 411.
61 Id. at 414.
62 See id. at 413.
63 See id.
6 Id. Shavell even notes that because some private parties might not have the resources to
bring legal claims that would otherwise be socially useful, there is justification for "certain
social efforts to promote access to the legal system, such as legal aid programs and small
claims courts." Id. at 287.
65 See id. at 445-50. Shavell's observations are remarkably consistent with new research
into the limitations of private legal systems. See, e.g., Amitai Aviram & Avishalom Tor,
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To his immense credit, then, Shavell acknowledges the importance of pub-
lic law in a world in which putative "Coasian" bargaining is but a fanciful
abstraction. Notwithstanding this major accomplishment, Foundations of Eco-
nomic Analysis of Law does have its own shortcomings.
III. SOME LIMITATIONS
I begin my critique by nit-picking. The book occasionally indulges in
overly simplistic legal descriptions that will strike lawyers reading the book as
platitudes.66 It also tends to place too much faith in the efficiency of financial
markets as risk-hedging mechanisms. 67 More generally, Shavell spends too
much time describing how the common law is efficient, rather than pushing for
legal reform. Readers are simply told that a host of doctrines-from laws
restricting dead hand control of property, 68 to providing for expectation reme-
dies,69 to requiring intent as an element of criminal culpability7°-make sense.
This type of analysis, however, is not new and has been put forth extensively
by scholars such as Richard Posner.7 Shavell thus misses an opportunity to
differentiate his approach and perhaps emphasize doctrines needing reform.
A. Constraints of a Neoclassical Toolkit
The root of the issue may simply be that Shavell unnecessarily limits the
economic tools that should be brought to bear when analyzing law. Like the
vast majority of preeminent law and economics scholars, he remains wedded to
the assumption that individuals are rational actors behaving according to the
predictors of neoclassical price theory. 72 Methodologically, such an assump-
tion necessarily deemphasizes important tools such as game theory and behav-
ioral economics. Substantively, it contributes to a bias against administrative
regulation.
Overcoming Impediments to Information Sharing, 55 ALA. L. REV. 231, 231-32 (2004)
("[W]hen deciding whether to share information, firms consider their private welfare. Dis-
crepancies between social and private welfare may therefore lead firms to share information
excessively to anticompetitive ends .... Sub-optimal information sharing can generate sig-
nificant social costs.").
66 See, e.g., SHAVELL, supra note 1, at 237 ("The starting principle in most legal systems is
that a liable party should pay for the actual level of losses caused, whether they be high or
low."); id. at 461 ("[T]he optimal investment in, and accuracy of the trial process is less
than it would be if there were no appeals process and no opportunity to correct errors."); id.
at 543 ("Society requires criminal law in order to constrain certain behavior that could not
otherwise adequately be controlled.").
67 See, e.g., id. at 61 ("The existence of a well-functioning annuities market, however, sub-
stantially qualifies the argument that individuals must hold property until death to assure
themselves necessary support if they live unexpectedly long."); id. at 261 ("Now let us
assume that insurance is available and sells at actuarially fair rates.").
68 See id. at 72.
69 See id. at 378.
70 See id. at 552-56.
71 See POSNER, supra note 4.
72 See supra note 6 and accompanying text. See also SHAVELL, supra note 1, at 207
("Firms will be presumed to maximize profits and to do business in a perfectly competitive
environment.").
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To begin with, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law could have
presented a wider range of analytical tools. There is no mention of game the-
ory, one of the most exciting new areas of research in economics which models
transactions as games among economic actors.7 3 For instance, with regard to
costs of litigation, the book does not take a position on the desirability of fee-
shifting 74 or hourly fee versus contingency-based compensation,75 and simi-
larly suggests ambiguities as to whether expectation or reliance damages should
be preferred in contract. 76 When discussing property rights, Shavell merely
tees up the advantages of liability rules77 and questions whether the "one-size-
fits-all" duration of intellectual property protections makes sense.7 8 Concrete
suggestions for reform might have emerged had he used game theory to try to
model interactions between lawyers and clients, or holders of intellectual prop-
erty and potential infringers.7 9
Another methodological gap is the text's extremely minimal emphasis on
behavioral economics, whose central tenet is that "assumptions about behavior
should accord with empirically validated descriptions of actual behavior."8
Shavell does on a few occasions refer to the behavioral literature-the "endow-
71 See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, Antitrust After the Interception: Of a Heroic Returner and
Myriad Paths, 55 STAN. L. REV. 287, 291 (2002) (book review) (Game theory "posits that
firms' optimal actions incorporate the anticipated reactions of their competitors, and vice
versa."). For an overview of game theory, see JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION 423-59 (1989).
74 See SHAVELL, supra note 1, at 432 ("lit is apparent that the influence of fee-shifting on
settlement might be socially beneficial or detrimental ... and that the effect of fee-shifting
on trial expenditures could be similarly ambiguous from a social standpoint.").
75 See id. at 436 ("[I]t appears that either hourly fee or outcome-based contingency arrange-
ments could be superior to the other, because either could lead to a higher expected gain
minus litigation costs.").
76 See id. at 360 ("There does not exist any damage measure that provides optimal incen-
tives both to perform and to rely: only the expectation measure provides optimal incentives
to perform, yet it does not provide proper incentives to rely.").
77 See id. at 42-43 ("A type of rule that is superior to a finders-keepers rule and also to the
original ownership rule is an original ownership rule combined with a mandatory reward
paid by the owner to the finder."); id. at 98 ("Liability rules possess a general administrative
cost advantage over the other rules in that under liability rules the legal system becomes
involved only if harm is done .... ). For a discussion of the advantages of liability rules,
see Dibadj, supra note 47.
78 See, e.g., SHAVELL, supra note 1, at 154 ("The uniform nature of the duration of patents
stands in significant contrast to the highly elaborated legal consideration given to whether to
award patents and to their proper scope. One suspects, therefore, that the fixed twenty-year
patent length could be improved."); id. at 157 ("[W]hy, for example, the duration of protec-
tion [for copyright] should be so much more generous than for patents, is not evident, and
one surmises that it has no clear rationale.").
79 As Robert Gibbons observes, "many modelers use game theory because it allows them to
think like economists when price theory does not apply. Examples abound: small numbers,
hidden information, hidden actions, and incomplete contracts can turn markets into games."
Robert Gibbons, Trust in Social Structures: Hobbes and Coase Meet Repeated Games 3
(2000), (unpublished manuscript), http://web.mit.edu/rgibbons/www/trust-sf.pdf.
80 Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1471, 1489 (1998). For an excellent overview of behavioral economics edited by two of the
field's pioneers, see CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky
eds., 2000).
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ment effect,"8 miscalculation of risk,82 overconfidence,8 3 and hyperbolic dis-
84 dsucounting. The discussion, however, is skeletal and all too often relegated to
footnotes. This lack of emphasis on behavioral realities has repercussions that
unfortunately detract from the overall force of the book. Sometimes, Shavell
makes bold behavioral assertions with precious little proof.85 Depictions of
individuals as utility-maximizing automatons occasionally stretch common
sense notions of how people behave.8 6 Shavell's copious discussion of deter-
rence, for instance, assumes an inverse linear correlation between enforcement
efforts and the degree of punishment,8 7 leading him to conclude that "a low
probability-high magnitude sanction policy is socially advantageous. 88 In
fact, research into how people actually behave points to precisely the opposite
conclusion: A high certainty of punishment, even with a low severity penalty,
is perhaps the most effective way of deterring individuals from anti-social
behavior.8 9
Beyond a limited toolkit, the book also displays a bias against administra-
tive regulation, typical of neoclassical theorists. The assumption underlying
this belief seems to be that the state does not possess good information:
Another general avenue for improvement would be to reduce the amount of regula-
tion, given that it requires regulators to have more information than they can be
expected to possess, and to substitute for regulation publicly imposed sanctions based
81 See SHAVELL, supra note 1, at 104 n.36. The "endowment effect" occurs when a person
demands more to sell a product than she is willing to pay to purchase it.
82 See id. at 216 ("Customers can readily be imagined to exaggerate certain kinds of risks,
because, for instance, of their vivid aspect (dying in an airplane crash), and they can well be
thought to underestimate other kinds of risk, because, say, of the innocuous appearance of
the products creating the risks .... "); id. at 481 ("[Iindividuals often experience difficulty in
assessing and interpreting probabilities .... ).
83 See id. at 405 (mentioning the "natural optimism about one's chances").
84 See id. at 71 n.74 ("[T]hose alive today might care very little about the well-being of
individuals ten generations in the future, but a social welfare measure might accord similar
weight to the well-being of individuals ten generations in the future as it does to the well-
being of the present generation.").
85 See, e.g., id. at 225 ("[A] fairly general consequence of uncertainty in the assessment of
true levels of care is that parties will tend to take more than due care-and thus to take
socially excessive levels of care ....").
86 See, e.g., id. at 271-72 (arguing that parents ought not receive significant compensation
upon the death of a child since this loss does not impose an economic burden on them); id. at
380-85 (trying to cabin the motivations of donors within rational choice theory); id. at 523
(positing that a risk-neutral individual would pay a $49.99 sanction in order to avert a fifty
percent chance of receiving a $100 sanction).
87 See id. at 483 ("[T]he sanction is governed by a fundamental probability-related multi-
plier-the sanction must equal the harm multiplied by the inverse of the probability of its
imposition.").
88 Id. at 484. See also id. at 491; id. at 527. But see id. at 508 ("[W]ithin some range,
raising the magnitude of sanctions may be a less economical way of achieving deterrence
than raising the likelihood of sanctions.").
89 See Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV.
349, 371-73 (1997). See also Reza Dibadj, Reconceiving the Firm, 26 CARDOZO L. REv.
1459 (2005) (extending behavioral arguments to organizational entities).
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on harm: namely, fines for harm (or fines inflated by the probability of discovery of
harm), and corrective taxes for expected harm.90
This stance is surprising for a number of reasons. Why would administra-
tive agencies have less information than courts, for example?9' Are courts
really best equipped to address the informational asymmetries and externalities
Shavell so eloquently describes?9" Indeed, as Coase suggests in his seminal
work, government regulation can lower, not increase, transaction costs:
[T]here is no reason why, on occasion, such governmental administrative regulation
should not lead to an improvement in economic efficiency. This would seem particu-
larly likely when ... a large number of people are involved and in which therefore
the costs of handling the problem through the market or the firm may be high.93
It is precisely the most difficult problems-those involving multiple con-
stituents and posing high transaction costs-where government regulation may
be the most helpful. To his credit, Shavell occasionally seems to appreciate
this reality, but only in very limited applications.9 4
B. A Utilitarian Vision for Welfare Economics
Beyond its embrace of neoclassicism, perhaps the biggest weakness of
Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law is the simplistic equivalence it
makes between welfare economics and utilitarianism. Shavell's project rests
on one central claim:
According to the framework of welfare economics, social welfare is assumed to be
[solely] a function of individuals' well-being, that is, of their utilities. An individ-
ual's utility, in turn, can depend on anything about which the individual cares: not
only material wants, but also, for example, aesthetic tastes, altruistic feelings, or a
desire for notions of fairness to be satisfied.95
In effect, Shavell is proposing a return to "old" school welfarism 9 6-remi-
niscent of the eighteenth century English philosopher Jeremy Bentham.9 7 It is
90 SHAVELL, supra note 1, at 591. See also id. at 37 ("The chief problem ... with any
regulatory approach, concerns the quality of the state's information about proper regulation
and the bluntness of its rules."); id. at 590 ("[Djesirable regulation requires the government
to obtain information that it is unlikely to possess for many acts affecting risk.").
91 See, e.g., id. at 180 n.6 ("It is assumed here (and elsewhere in this chapter) that a court
can determine a party's level of care with complete accuracy.").
92 See supra notes 20-30 and accompanying text.
9 Coase, supra note 20, at 18.
94 See, e.g., SHAVELL, supra note 1, at 32 ("[I]f it would be difficult for the many individu-
als living in a neighborhood to contract with each other to keep lot sizes from being too
small, regulation of lot size would be necessary to accomplish their common goal."); id. at
232 ("[A] regulatory authority might mandate that milk be pasteurized or that trucks carrying
explosives not travel through tunnels. Such regulation could force parties to reduce risks in
socially beneficial ways that would not be induced by the threat of liability."); id. at 278
("[R]egulation of [liability insurance] coverage may help to increase an otherwise too low
effort to reduce risk.").
95 Id. at 2. See also id. at 634 ( "Arguably, the only overarching principle that could ration-
alize all these diverse rules is that of a general utilitarianism, of social welfare maximiza-
tion."). For a more technical exposition of the idea, see id. at 597 n.4.
96 See Daniel A. Farber, What (If Anything) Can Economics Say About Equity?, 101 MICH.
L. REV. 1791, 1796 (2003).
97 Indeed, Shavell acknowledges a debt to Bentham in the first few pages of the book. See
SHAVELL, supra note 1, at 4.
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worth emphasizing that, although I do not find the Benthamite tradition within
welfare economics convincing, its perspective can represent an improvement
over the ordinalist conception of welfare economics that dominated the second
half of the twentieth century. 98 Ordinalism generated magnificent theoretical
puzzles,9 9 but almost drove welfare economics into irrelevance.' Shavell
thus deserves enormous credit for helping make welfare economics relevant
again by refocusing on an earlier, more pragmatic, paradigm. 10'
While Shavell's utilitarianism might be a great improvement over ordinal-
ism, it nonetheless stumbles on three fronts: utility is ill-defined, distributional
questions are ignored, and moral concerns are assumed away. First, the defini-
tion of "utility" is too broad to be of practical use:
The utility of a person is an indicator of his well-being, whatever might constitute
that well-being. Thus, not only do food, shelter, and all the material and hedonistic
pleasures and pains affect utility, but so also does the satisfaction, or lack thereof, of
a person's aesthetic sensibilities, his altruistic and sympathetic feelings for others, his
sense of what constitutes fair treatment for himself and for others. 102
Readers searching for a better definition are told, somewhat unhelpfully,
"that there is a measurable level of a chemical, or of electrical activity in a
region of the brain, that is higher the higher the person's reported well-being is,
and that this particular quantity serves as utility."' 0 3 Even if we assume, argu-
endo, that utility could somehow be measured, its use presents additional
problems. As Amartya Sen has observed, "[m]ental reactions, the mainstay of
classical utility, can be a very defective basis for the analysis of deprivation.
Thus, in understanding poverty and inequality, there is a strong case for look-
ing at real deprivation and not merely at mental reactions to that depriva-
tion.' '  Second, by defining social welfare as "a function solely of
individuals' (subjective) utilities,""°5 Shavell makes aggregating utilities tricky.
After all, some type of objective measure is needed to permit interpersonal
comparisons of the sort Shavell suggests when he notes that "there is a vast
98 Welfare economists would assume that only an ordinal ranking of a person's preferences
is possible, but no more. Cardinality, as opposed to ordinality, provides a scale to measure
intensity of preference. See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-
Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE L.J. 165, 191-92 (1999). Cardinality, of course, is a prerequisite
to performing interpersonal comparisons.
99 The most famous puzzle remains Arrow's brilliant impossibility theorem. See KENNETH
J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 4 (2d ed. 1963).
100 For a detailed discussion of the ordinalist revolution in welfare economics, see Reza
Dibadj, Weasel Numbers, 27 CARoozo L. REV. - (forthcoming 2006).
"I1 Shavell, of course, is not alone. Perhaps the economist whohas done the most to rethink
welfare economics is Amartya Sen. See, e.g., Amartya Sen, The Possibility of Social
Choice, 89 AM. EcON. REV. 349, 352 (1999). Some legal commentators have also joined the
fray. See, e.g., Adler & Posner, supra note 98, at 195; Dibadj, Numbers, supra note 100.
102 SHAVELL, supra note 1, at 596.
103 Id. at 596 n. 2.
1o Sen, supra note 101, at 363 (emphasis added). Sen advocates a need to look to "other
indicators of individual advantages, such as real incomes, opportunities, primary goods, or
capabilities." Amartya Sen, Rationality and Social Choice, 85 AM. EcON. REV. 1, 8 (1995).
105 SHAVELL, supra note 1, at 598.
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multitude of ways of aggregating individual utilities into a measure of social
welfare." 1
0 6
Second, Shavell's brand of welfare economics simplistically assumes that
distributional questions should be the exclusive province of the tax system.
This may seem curious at first, since-based on the idea that "redistributing a
dollar from a rich individual with a low marginal utility of income to a poor
individual with a high marginal utility of income will raise social welfare""' 7-
the book clearly acknowledges that "the distribution of utilities generally mat-
ters. ' 10 8 Nonetheless, his view is apparently that "if one assumes that the
income tax and transfer system will be used to bring about desirable changes in
the distribution of income, the distributional effect of the choice of legal rules
should not matter."' 10 9
Much like with his discussion of the difference between private and social
welfare, Shavell's approach is akin to that of Pigou,1" ° who preferred to
address questions of redistribution through "bounties and taxes." '1 1 It is also
consistent with the Second Fundamental Theorem of welfare economics which
assumes that "almost any Pareto optimal equilibrium can be supported via the
competitive mechanism, provided appropriate lump-sum taxes and transfers
are imposed on individuals and firms."' 2 The Second Theorem appears capti-
vating, 113 except for the inconvenient fact that it has virtually no application to
reality. As Daniel Farber and Brett McDonnell observe, "the well-known prob-
lem with the second theorem is that lump-sum taxes and transfers are not
achievable in the real world. Any actual system of taxing and transferring will
affect the behavioral incentives of some persons, and hence lead to some
106 Id. at 597. On the subject of interpersonal comparisons, see generally INTERPERSONAL
COMPARISONS OF WELL-BEING (Jon Elster & John E. Roemer eds., 1991).
107 SHAVELL, supra note 1, at 648 n.2. This idea is, once again reflective of the "old"
school welfare economics which emerged in the early twentieth century. See, e.g., Jacob
Viner, The Utility Concept in Value Theory and Its Critics, 33 J. POL. ECON. 369 (1925);
A.C. PIGOU, INCOME: AN INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMICS 83 (1948). Of course, too much
redistribution is bad public policy. There needs to be a balance, which Shavell clearly recog-
nizes. See SHAVELL, supra note 1, at 652 (discussing "two costs associated with redistribu-
tion: administrative costs and the implicit costs of the dulling of work incentives.")..
108 SHAVELL, supra note 1 at 597.
'0 Id. at 3. See also id. at 592 ("[A]ltering the design of the legal system to achieve distri-
butional equity might needlessly compromise achievement of other social goals."); id. at 647
("[L]egal rules should be selected on the basis of nondistributional objectives.").
110 See supra note 40.
"I A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 192 (4th ed. 1960). See also A.C. PIGOU,
ESSAYS IN ECONOMICS 210 (1952).
112 John M. Gowdy, The Revolution in Welfare Economics and Its Implications for Environ-
mental Valuation and Policy, 80 LAND ECON. 239, 240 (2004) (emphasis added). For its
part, the First Fundamental Theorem can be summarized as follows: "Assume that all indi-
viduals and firms are selfish price takers. Then a competitive equilibrium is Pareto optimal."
Id.
113 Indeed, there is a long tradition in welfare economics amenable to achieving redistribu-
tion via taxes and transfers. See, e.g., Kevin Roberts, The Theoretical Limits to Redistribu-
tion, 51 REv. EcoN. STUD. 177, 193 (1984); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Triangulating the
Administrative State, 78 CALIF. L. REv. 1415, 1425 (1990).
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degree of inefficiency.""'14 Indeed, as Coase implies, Pigovian taxes are only
one ingredient in social choice theory." 5 Curiously, however, Shavell devotes
precious little analysis to contrasting the costs of the tax system to other admin-
istrative means of redistribution.' 16 Perhaps, then, an exclusive reliance on the
tax system to achieve redistribution is just one manifestation of a stance
opposed to administrative regulation.'' 7
A third major limitation in the welfare economics Shavell proposes is the
exclusion of deontological concerns. In his conception, "notions [of morality]
should not be given importance in social welfare evaluation beyond that associ-
ated with their functionality and with our taste for their satisfaction-no deon-
tological importance should be accorded them-for doing so would conflict
with social welfare and lead to its reduction."' "l 8 Inexplicably, Shavell even
seems to accord greater importance to law than to morality; to him, "law is
fairly flexibly designed to promote social welfare, whereas our system of
morality has a relatively unrefined character."" 9
One does not need to resolve the centuries-old debate between deontolo-
gists and consequentialists' 2 ° to note that this argument leaves much to be
desired. In essence, Shavell first defines morality as separate from utility,' 2 '
then conveniently states that only utility should matter: "I am defining a
114 Daniel A. Farber & Brett H. McDonnell, Why (and How) Fairness Matters at the IPI
Antitrust Interface, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1817, 1824 (2003). See also id. at 1825-26
("[R]edistribution through tax and transfer policies may not work well. They may not be
politically feasible."). Cf. Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Invisible Hand and Modem Welfare Eco-
nomics 2-3 (NBER Working Paper No. 3641) (1991) ("The first theorem states that (under
certain conditions) the competitive economy is always Pareto efficient; the second theorem
says that every Pareto efficient allocation can be attained through the price system. All (!)
the government needs to do is engage in some initial lump sum transfers (taxes and
subsidies).").
115 See supra note 93. See also Dahlman, supra note 31, at 160-61 ("[T]he Coase line of
reasoning does not limit attention to tax rates alone .... Not only Pigovian taxes, but all
other weapons in the government's arsenal becomes available as well.").
116 Comparisons are between the income tax system and common law courts. See, e.g.,
SHAVELL, supra note 1, at 660 ("[W]here the administrative costs of the income tax system
exceed those of legal rules as a means of transferring income, then legal rules might be
selected on the basis of their distributional effects. ... ). Other commentators seem to
ignore administrative agencies in their comparative analyses as well. See, e.g., A. MITCHELL
POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 153 (3d ed. 2003) ("Roughly speak-
ing, to transfer a dollar through a private lawsuit from a defendant to a plaintiff costs on
average about a dollar in administrative costs .... To transfer a dollar through the tax and
transfer system costs only a fraction of this amount."); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why
the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J.
LEGAL STUD. 667, 675 (1994) ("[I]t seems unlikely that courts can accomplish significant
redistribution through the legal system without attracting the attention of legislators.").
117 See supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
118 SHAVELL, supra note 1, at 608. See also id. at 611 ("[T]hat any person who believes
that a measure of social welfare should rise whenever the utilities of all individuals rise...
must abandon any view that ascribes independent importance to a notion of morality, that is,
any deontological view.").
119 Id. at 617.
120 For instance, the importance society should accord to individual autonomy and absolute
notions of morality are subjects of enduring debate.
121 Interestingly, no definition of morality is offered. See id. at 548 ("I will not attempt to
define here the moral quality of an act, but will rely on the reader's intuition as a guide.").
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(nondistributional) notion of morality to be a principle for the evaluation of
situations that (a) does not depend exclusively on the utilities of individuals,
and (b) is associated with the distinctive psychological attributes leading, as
described, to virtue and guilt, praise and disapproval."' 2 2 The argument is
plainly circular, making it difficult to take seriously.' 2 3
The overarching irony is that Shavell's inability to define utility and
attempt to duck deontological and distributional questions lead him in many
places to adopt in practice precisely the standard he has critiqued so well:
wealth maximization.' 2 4 After all, if distributional and deontological concerns
are set aside, one can simplistically assume that social welfare consists of "the
benefits that individuals obtain from acts minus the harms done and the costs of
enforcement of law."'' 25  Indeed, across all doctrinal areas-property, 26
torts, 127 contracts, 128 procedure,129 and public law'°3 0 -cost/benefit analysis
unfortunately becomes the order of the day.1
3
'
CONCLUSION
There are, of course, other paths to welfare economics and the economic
analysis of law that Shavell might have explored. One alternative approach, as
I argue elsewhere,' 3 2 uses a critique of wealth maximization as a new foray
into social choice theory. I propose a social welfare function that takes both
122 Id. at 601.
123 In an earlier article, Shavell even admits the tautology. See Louis Kaplow & Steven
Shavell, Fairness v. Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 971 (2001) ("Our first argument, that
advancing notions of fairness reduces individuals' well-being, is in fact tautological on a
general level."). Critics have pounced. See, e.g., Michael B. Dorff, Why Welfare Depends
on Fairness: A Reply to Kaplow and Shavell, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 847, 857 (2002) ("If
'fairness' consists of any philosophy that ignores welfare, then it seems virtually inevitable
that applying determinative fairness criteria will, at least in some instances, decrease social
welfare."); David Dolinko, The Perils of Welfare Economics, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 351, 353
(2002) (calling the argument "logically circular, thus carrying no weight at all").
124 See supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text.
125 SHAVELL, supra note 1, at 575. See also id. at 492-93 ("Social welfare is assumed to
equal the benefits that parties obtain from their acts, less the harm done by the acts, less the
costs of enforcement, and less the costs associated with the imposition of sanctions.").
126 See, e.g., id. at 39 ("Our social welfare criterion will continue to be the expected value
of property minus the costs of effort ....").
127 See, e.g., id. at 178 ("The social goal here will be minimization of the sum of the costs
of care and of expected accident losses. This sum will be called total social costs.").
128 See, e.g., id. at 339 ("[M]utually beneficial completely specified contracts call for per-
formance if and only if the value of performance exceeds its cost.").
129 See, e.g., id. at 403 ("[A] mutually beneficial settlement exists as long as the plaintiff's
estimate of the expected judgment does not exceed the defendant's estimate by more than the
sum of their costs of trial.").
130 See, e.g., id. at 513 ("We might define the effectiveness of a sanction to be the disutility
it generates per dollar of social cost.").
131 The devolution to welfare maximization also occurs in one of Shavell's famous earlier
articles. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 123, at 1054-58 (applying welfare maximization
to torts); id. at 1125-29 (applying welfare maximization to contracts).
132 See Dibadj, supra note 100.
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consequential and deontological perspectives into account.' 33 My framework
avoids the intractable question of defining utility as well-being. Instead "util-
ity" is re-defined with respect to how closely a set of individual preferences
maps to a set of welfare-enhancing preferences. The social welfare function
begins with a set of individual preferences, but then effectuates transformations
through paternalism and redistribution.' 3 4 Regardless of whether readers will
agree with such an approach, the overarching message should hopefully be
clear: It is time to get beyond stale debates between "old" and "new" welfare
economics, between utilitarians and ordinalists. Foundations of Economic
Analysis of Law misses an opportunity to join such a debate.
Despite this limitation and its concomitant adherence to neoclassical tools,
I unhesitatingly recommend Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law to any-
one interested in the intersection of legal and economic discourses. Professor
Shavell treats readers to an immensely informative, enjoyable, and thought-
provoking book. However, had the book not remained wedded to the limits of
neoclassicism and utilitarianism it would be even better.
133 For a thought-provoking discussion of the importance of morality in economics, see
AMITAI ETZIONI, THE MORAL DIMENSION (1988).
134 More precisely, I argue that (i) paternalism is a function that transforms a set of individ-
ual preferences into a set of modified individual preferences, and (ii) redistribution is part of
the aggregation function from these modified individual preferences to social welfare. See
Dibadj, supra note 100.
[Vol. 6:201
